Elementary ( rst-order) and non-elementary (set-theoretic) aspects of the largest bisimulation are considered, with a view towards analyzing operational semantics from the perspective of predicate logic. The notion of a bisimulation is employed in two distinct ways: (i) as an extensional notion of equivalence on programs (or processes) generalizing input/output equivalence (at a cost exceeding 1 1 over certain transition predicates computable in log space), and (ii) as a tool for analyzing the dependence of transitions on data (which can be shown to be elementary or non-elementary, depending on the formulation of the transitions).
Fundamental de nitions and facts
The present section reviews some well-known material, found, for example, in Milner 28] . A (labelled) transition system is a triple hL; S; !i where ! S L S. L is said to be the set of labels, S the set of states, ! the transition predicate, and a transition (s; l; s 0 ) 2 ! is written s $, where $ ! = T n<! $ n is a conjunction of \ nitary" predicates $ n . That is to say, $ ! can be captured by a nitary formal language, as spelled out in Hennessy and Milner 24] . The equivalence $ ! need not, however, coincide with $, as demonstrated below (where jLj = 1).
... ...
. . . Figure 1 This notorious pair is surely too trivial to ignore! (Confusing them is problematic inasmuch as the in nite branch can be interpreted as a failure of termination, or say, an unfair merging of an in nite stream 1 1 
Some basic results and related work
A transition system hL; S !i can be viewed as the rst-order model hL S; L; !i over the signature f _ L; ;g consisting of a unary relation symbol _ L (for the labels) and a ternary relation symbol ; (for !). Passing to the case where L is a singleton flg, it is standard practice in modal logic (e.g., van Benthem 9] ) to study the transition system hflg; S; !i as the rst-order model hS; f(s; s 0 ) j s l ! s 0 gi over the signature fRg consisting of a binary relation symbol R. Such fRg-models are called Kripke frames, and can be expanded into Kripke models for a propositional modal language over propositional letters p; q; : : : by introducing interpretations for unary predicate symbols U p ; U q ; : : : (marking the states on which the corresponding letters p; q; : : : are interpreted to be true). The framework of Kripke semantics then speci es a translation mapping a formula of the propositional modal language into a rst-order fR; U p ; U q ; : : :g-formula over some xed free variable x (standing for a state) | e.g.,
Now, for a suitable notion of bisimulation invariance, it turns out that Theorem A (van Benthem 9]) A rst-order fR; U p ; U q ; : : :g-formula with one free variable is invariant for bisimulation i it is logically equivalent to the translation of some modal formula. Looking more closely at the translation of modal formulas, observe that variables can be \re-used" so that, for example, the translation of 2(p & 32q) can be rewritten as (8yR ?1 x) U p (y) & (9xR ?1 y)(8yR ?1 x) U q (y) ; requiring only two variables x; y, free or bound. Generalizing the notion of a bisimulation to that of an n-simulation, one can show 3 Theorem B (e.g., van Benthem 10]) A rst-order fR; U p ; U q ; : : :g-formula with free variables x 1 ; : : :; x n is invariant for n-simulation i it can be written using only the n variables x 1 ; : : :; x n free or bound. Whatever satisfaction Theorems A and B may give, the reader is entitled to ask what does propositional modal logic have to do with our present concerns? Quite a bit, according to Stirling 31] . The Hennessy-
Milner 24] characterization of $ ! is based on what is essentially a propositional modal logic, the only di erence (beyond notation) being that many labels are required (and, in fact, one propositional letter will su ce). The theorems above adapt easily to this case, suggesting (together) that the propositional modal language corresponds, via the notion of a bisimulation, to a restricted 2-variable fragment of the rst-order language over f _ L; ;; U p ; U q ; : : :g. Setting aside, however, the propositional modal language, and examining the rst-order language f _ L; ;g of transition systems directly, it is easy to see that bisimilarity, in fact, exceeds rst-order logic. As pointed out in van Benthem and Bergstra 8], bisimilarity cannot be de ned by an in nite set of rst-order sentences. This is strengthened by the following theorem, which considers bisimulations on a transition system (rather than on a pair of di erent ones), viewed as a rst-order f _ L; ;g-model. Every transition system has an elementary extension over which $ = $ ! (i.e., $ ! $ !+1 ). By Fact 0, it follows that the transition system described by the theorem cannot validate $ = $ ! (and, in particular, the transition system must support in nite branching). Accordingly, take a transition system with $ ! ? $ 6 = ; (e.g., Figure 1 of formulas in x, even though it is nitely satis able there. The signi cance of Fact 2 (in the proof of Theorem A 0 ) is limited by the failure of an elementary extension to respect (in general) $ for > !. (The stronger notion of an \end" extension is needed to preserve bisimilarity.) Put plainly, if a process is understood to be given by its set of transitions, then it is hardly surprising that a process becomes a second-order concept not preserved under elementary extensions.
Turning next to Theorem B, the partial isomorphisms (and Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games) lying behind the n-simulations can, under a modi ed setting, be employed to build an isomorphism (rather than merely to establish elementary equivalence). The modi cation is based on introducing individuals (packaged in a rst-order model) rather than abstracting them away as in propositional modal logic. Hence, in the terminology of van Benthem 11], the rather meager \programming repertoire" A guarantees safety for bisimulations | i.e., any expansion of the label set A in which the transitions are de ned \uni-formly" from a countable rst-order model will preserve bisimulations. Proof: given a transition system on valuations, take its restriction to the above label set, and pass the isomorphism between M and N, described by Theorem B 0 , on to the original transition system.] For an illustration of what is meant by \uniform" (beyond the requirement that isomorphic objects in -models map to isomorphic states of the transition systems de ned from the -models), see the next section, where an additional feature of e ectiveness is introduced. That section considers more carefully transitions that are relevant to the study of operational semantics in the following sense.
Going back (at least) to Turing, mechanical computation has been characterized by transitions c ! c 0 between \con gurations" c and c 0 subject to a certain set of rules. (Recall the notion of legal moves between instantaneous descriptions.) The transitions will be labelled soon enough, but for the moment, let us take the transitions to be unlabelled. Let us decompose a con guration c into a \data" component d and a control are analyzed in dynamic logic (e.g., Harel 23] ) compositionally over programs conceived as input/output relations. That is to say, such programs are determined completely by transitions into (d 0 ; p ). In general, Other rules might include
The rules above are not \complete", but meant simply to provide some intuition. (Note that, from the point of view of predicate logic, \rule" here is better read as \axiom" | and the presentation of such axioms is unfortunate | in that the premiss should be interpreted locally over a xed model, rather than globally over a family of models.) The treatment of generalizes easily to solutions to recursive equations. Synchronization on actions can also be accomodated, by adding the actions (on which processes synchronize) to the underlying rst-order model. See with the idea of using bisimilarity on programs p; p 0 as a notion of program equivalence. This is taken up in section 4, which investigates further the co-inductive construction of bisimilarity, and is in this sense a natural sequel to Theorem A 0 above. Before, however, carrying out an analysis that takes data for granted (relegating it to labels of a transition system, where, in fact, it is commonly abstracted away), let us consider more carefully just what is taken for granted, and see if we can come up with a story di erent from that o ered by Theorem B 0 .
Bisimulations and data dependence
To where (i) l 1 ; : : :; l n ; l 2 L, (ii) s 1 ; t 1 ; : : :; s n ; t n ; s; t are state-variables (not to be confused with variables in X, but meant rather to range over M-valuations, for -models M), and (iii) the condition C r (s 1 ; t 1 ; : : :; s n ; t n ; s; t) enjoys the following \uniformity" property relative to for all nite subsets X 1 ; Y 1 ; : : :; X n ; Y n ; X 0 ; Y 0 of X, there is a -formula ' 2 with free variables among 1 
Lemma 1 (Record Property). Every transition proved from -uniform rules has a record in 9 . Proof. Every theorem has a nite derivation tree, from which a record in 9 can be extracted: local descriptions of the tree (by formulas in ) are glued together by conjunction, before existentially quantifying out old values of program variables. a
The converse of Lemma 1 is even easier: transitions with records in can be presented as theorems of -uniform rules (where the side conditions C r do all the work, and are given by the records). It appears, however, that, in practice, a transition relation is more naturally presented in terms of -uniform rules.
Accordingly, we will work with transition systems M R = hL; S M ; ! M i where ! M consists of the theorems of a set R of -uniform rules. It will prove convenient to equate M R with the pointed transition system (hL; S M ; ! M i; ;) where the initial state ; is the totally unde ned function. Also, given -models M and N and a set of -formulas, let us write M N when M and N satisfy the same -sentences in . (Note the switch from formulas to sentences | i.e., formulas with no free variables.) Since transitions are determined by records, it is natural to seek out a translation L on pointed transition systems so that
. In fact, as we now show, L can be de ned in a familiar way | essentially, the subset construction in automata theory, mapping non-deterministic nite automata to deterministic nite automata. ) is a partial function on L(S) that is not always de ned since the empty set is excluded from L(S) (lest the notion of a bisimulation become trivial over the image of L). The empty set would represent an \absurd" state, indicating the failure to make a transition (in S). Such failures completely determine bisimilarity over the deterministic transition systems L(S); isomorphism (over the image of L) captures (prima facie) a bit more structure | namely, for any sequence of labels l 1 ; : : :; l n , the set (viewed externally) of states in S accessible from the initial state of S by transitions labelled by l 1 ; : : :; l n . The logical signi cance of L is brought out partly in Fernando 18] , and partly below.
Concentrating on the case of L(M R ), let us write l] M for the interpretation of l 2 L by L(M R ) (omitting the subscript R for notational simplicity). The key to establishing (y), the non-trivial part of which is isomorphism, is Lemma 2. Let R be a set of -uniform rules, M 9 , and that R is a set of -uniform rules, including rules for sequential composition, random assignments x :=? for x 2 X, and tests '? for all ' 2 . For -models M and N, the following are equivalent.
(
Proof.`(i) implies (ii)' is Theorem 4;`(ii) implies (iii)' is trivial ( = always implies $); and`(iii) implies At any rate, by equating bisimilaritywith isomorphism under L, Corollary 5 reduces L(S) to the sequences l 1 ; : : :; l n of labels for which the initial state of S fails to make a transition. The most technically involved part of the argument above is the omission of types in Lemma 2. The idea of working with \small" models contrasts with the appeal in Theorems A and A 0 to \large" (saturated) models (borrowing the \terminology" from Keisler 26] ). Omitting types arguments often arise when showing completeness for an !-rule. Making a turn towards the opposite direction, the inadequacy of an !-rule is exposed in the next section, where the point is that certain second-order types cannot be omitted. Whereas the dependence of transitions on data is analyzed above by internalizing the non-determinism of transitions in states taken as sets (according to the logical translation L), the notion of a bisimulation is applied in the next section to give an equivalence on programs, leading to a di erent use of sets (i.e., as equivalence classes). 4 Bisimulations and extensionality generalized beyond 1 1 A fundamental problem in programming language semantics is the notion of identity on programs. On the one hand, equating a program with its text defeats the very point of the semantics/syntax distinction, contributing nothing to the intuition that there is an abstract notion here (call it a program) that may have more than one syntactic presentation. On the other hand, reducing a program to the input/ouput relation it computes abstracts away how that relation is computed | which is often of some interest. A notion of equivalence between programs can be de ned relative to a xed level of abstraction speci ed by transitions and then forming bisimilarity over this transition system. In process semantics as well as in so-called structural operational semantics (Plotkin 30] ), data is typically abstracted away, and the label (d; d 0 ) replaced by an \atomic action" a (presumably taking d to d 0 ; see, e.g., Fernando 17] ). Before abstracting away the data (and the labels), however, let us observe that bisimilarity subsumes input/output equivalence, since the graph of a program is a speci cation of transitions at a certain level of abstraction (from initial to terminal states). In case all transitions represent completed input/output computations (i.e., in case all transitions end at p ), then bisimilarity is simply input/output equivalence. Otherwise, transition predicates ! and ! at might be de ned inductively according to it is noteworthy that bisimilarity can be viewed as an equality predicate on sets, as developed at length in Aczel 4] . (That is, bisimilarity can be just about any equivalence you want, provided the transition predicateis chosen appropriately.) These sets can, of course, be somewhat abstract | as with equivalences based on logical characterizations in some language (where the sets in question are formed out of the formulas satis ed by the processes). But the reduction to bisimilarity need not always require a heroic leap of imagination, as illustrated above. At any rate, one might certainly ask whether some sort of translation exists in principle, before worrying about just exactly how it looks. Accordingly, the slogan the scope of the notion of a bisimulation rests on its complexity can be construed in the rigorous sense in which logical complexity is measured by the existence of translations. Turning then to these precise measures, note that as input/output equivalence is, in general, 0 2 -complete, its reduction to bisimilarity requires a context that can support that complexity. By contrast, bisimilarity is commonly taken to be at worst 0 1 in process semantics (e.g., Bloom, Istrail and Meyer 12]) by working with a transition system in which only nitely many transitions are possible from a state (whence $ ! = $), and that nite set is computable (whence $ ! is 0 1 ). The reduction to input/output equivalence above need not involve in nite branching (on any xed label), but the transitive closure in may generate undecidable transitions (that will, however, still be r.e. provided ! is).
In fact, as we will soon see, the transition predicate can be kept to a very low mechanical complexity (i.e., linear time!) while still blowing up bisimilarity well beyond 0 2 . Bisimilarity is manifestly 1 1 relative to its transition predicate, but whether this bound is optimal is stated to be open in Darondeau 15] (p. 229). The rest of this section is devoted to establishing (z) There is a transition predicate of low complexity over which bisimilarity is not 1 1 : As far as (z) is concerned, it turns out that we can make do with a singleton label set | which is to say that labels are a notational nuisance. Accordingly, in the remainder of the present section, transition predicates will be understood to be binary relations on !, and bisimilarity relative to such a relation ; will be construed as that de ned over the transition system hf g; !; f(n; ; m) j n ; mgi. A fact complicating (z) is that bisimilarity is also 1 1 (whence 1 1 ) over well-founded transition predicates | a result implicit in Barwise, Gandy and Moschovakis 6] (p. 115), as well as in van Benthem and Bergstra 8] (p. 27). Hence, we will also consider non-well-founded transition predicates. Moreover, turning to the co-inductive characterization of bisimilarity, note that for bisimilarity to fall outside 1 1 , the co-inductive construction must not terminate at any stage named by a recursive ordinal. So, keeping all these ordinals in view, consider the Church-Kleene system O of ordinal notations, which, for the purposes of (z), can be presented as follows.
Fix a standard enumeration fheig e2! of unary primitive recursive functions, and de ne the transition predicate ! inductively by the following rules, where n; e; m and k range over ! While we will have no reason to assign nite ordinals unique notations, the rule scheme (trans) and the premisses of the rules for 3 5 e ! hei(n) are introduced to secure Lemma 6. The relation ! is transitive, and, moreover, for every a 2 !, if ! restricted to fag fb j a ! bg is irre exive, then ! restricted to fag fb j a ! bg is, in fact, a linear order.
This technical condition pushes through the limit clause of the induction argument for 11
Lemma 7 (essentially Klop 27] ). For every a 2 O, and every b 2 !, a$b i b 2 O and jbj = jaj :
As indicated in the previous result, the transition system we are dealing with is very close to the \ordinal processes" of Klop 27 ] | i.e., transition systems given by a singleton label set, a successor ordinal as the state set, and the ordering > as the transition predicate. The crucial di erence is that the states in the present transition system may be non-well-founded | a property that we exploit next. Following Feferman and of the possibility of non-hyperarithmetic descending sequences (for which, thankfully, we already know ( )).
Next, given anâ 2 O ?O, observe that ! restricted to fâg fa jâ ! ag is a linear order (by Lemma 6).
Following the well-known reduction of r.e. orders to primitive recursive orders, de ne a primitive recursive function fâ by fâ(n) = â if P n a = ; the a s.t. the least p 2 P n a provesâ ! a otherwise where (under a natural G odel numbering of proofs with a primitive recursive proof predicate) P n a = fp < n j p provesâ ! a for some a 6 = fâ(0); : : :; fâ(n ? 1) s.t. (8i < n) (9q < n) q proves a ! fâ(i) or q proves fâ(i) ! ag : It follows from Lemma 6 that the image of fâ is precisely fâg fa jâ ! ag. Now, let !â be the primitive f This is a 0 1 problem easily reducible to bisimilarity. g if not, then a 6 2 Zâ; otherwise, search the n such that fâ(n) = a, concluding that a 2 Zâ i n$â0.
By Friedman 20] ,â can be chosen such that O is recursive in Zâ. But O is 1 1 -complete (under many-one reductions, no less) and bisimilarity is 1 1 . Thus, Theorem 9. There is a primitive recursive transition predicate over which bisimilarity is 1 1 -complete under Turing reductions (whence non-1 1 ).
Setting aside the question of Turing-completeness, and concentrating exclusively on establishing $ 6 2 1 1 , we can do without Friedman 20] , appealing instead to Grigorie 22] and 1 1 -boundedness (and perhaps to Gandy 21] rather than Feferman and Spector 16] , in which case replace Lemma 8 by the lemma that over a linear order >, a$a 0 i a = a 0 or neither a nor a 0 belong to the well-founded part of > ; which can be easily proved) to deduce Corollary 10. There is a transition predicate computable in DTIME-SPACE(n; log(n)) over which bisimilarity is not 1 1 . Proof. By the result announced as the title of Grigorie 22] , the linear order !â above has an isomorphic copy in DTIME-SPACE(n; log(n)), call it ). Let n be the image in ) of the top element 0 of !â (corresponding toâ), and note that bisimilarity , over ) cannot be 1 1 , or else ) restricted to fm 2 ! j n ) m and not n,mg is a 1 1 well-ordering of length ! CK 1 (contradicting 1 1 -boundedness). a Theorem 9 and Corollary 10 provide intrinsic measures of bisimilarity's complexity, from which it follows that a logical characterization ( a la Hennessy-Milner) of bisimilarity (over transitions computable in linear time) requires a non-hyperarithmetic notion of satisfaction. Reducing bisimilarity to its nitary approximations (as in Theorems A and A 0 ) just shoves the problem over to the transition predicate (polluting it with non-standard programs); the complexity of what is analyzed by induction (or co-induction) becomes trivial compared to what is assumed at the base case! An (arithmetic) !-rule is simply insu cient to capture a non-1 1 concept. A logic for bisimilarity requires more than 1 1 notions of inference well-known to be adequate for dynamic logic (under translations described, for example, in Harel 23] ). We are led to a ight in logical complexity, not unlike that suggested in Darondeau and Yoccoz 14] . The root r 1 is pictured by the transition system to the left of Figure 1 , whereas r 3 is pictured by the transition system to the right. Both transition systems provide solutions for x 1 , whereas only the right provides a solution for x 3 . But the states r 1 and r 3 cannot co-exist in a model where $ = $ ! , forcing us to choose between a solution for x 3 and the least solution (in terms of transitions) to x 1 . (Note that as a solution to x 1 = l + x 1 l, the right transition system has an in nite branch representing an unfair merge between l and x 1 l, where x 1 l is always chosen.) Insofar as least xed points (i.e., inductively de ned sets) are ordinarily 1 1 sets, this discrepancy is hardly surprising since bisimilarity may easily be non-1 1 .
Indeed, given that bisimilarity may have such complexity, 3 a natural question is is bisimilarity a reasonable notion of process equality? So long as the concept of a process is, however, understood as a logical abstraction (grounded, hopefully, in a mechanical reality), why impose an absolute limit on the logical complexity of a notion of process equality? Abstract reasoning and mechanical computation are two very di erent activities. Abstract concepts are our friends, and to insist that they be mechanically computable would be to seek rather dull company. What matters (from the point of view of theoretical computer science) is that they have something interesting to say about mechanical computation. The basic thrust of the present work has been to suggest the notion of a bisimulation as a link grounding generalized (abstract) recursion theory in ordinary (mechanical) recursion theory, according to the picture programs processes (among other sets) α Figure 2 adapted from Barwise 7] (pp. 42, 43, etc.). Figure 2 describes a universe of sets built hierarchically along an ordinal from a collection of urelements, which (in the present case) are given by programs, construed as syntactic objects, and analyzed semantically as processes (i.e., sets 4 ). The ordinal is, by a theorem of Gandy's (see Barwise 7] , p. 211) an upper bound on the closure ordinal for the operator bf co-inductively computing bisimilarity. Furthermore, the upper bound is tight, as the equivalance underlying the quotient construction in Barwise, Gandy and Moschovakis 6] of the next admissible set (via hyperprojective wellfounded trees) is, in fact, bisimilarity. Building on the results of the present paper, Fernando 19 ] traces the step from ordinary to generalized recursion back to a semantic analysis of a transition-based, mechanical notion of computation (and explores that semantic analysis further).
